COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

MIDDLESEX SS. SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 95-7378

***************************************

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, *

Plaintiff *

*

vs. *

*

PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, R.J. *

REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, BROWN & *

WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION, *

B.A.T. INDUSTRIES P.L.C., LORILLARD *

TOBACCO COMPANY, NEW ENGLAND *

WHOLESALE TOBACCO CO., INC., *

ALBERT H. NOTINI & SONS, INC., THE *

COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH-U.S.A., *

INC., and THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, INC. *

Defendants *

***************************************

BEFORE: SOSMAN, J.

Thursday

July 16, 1998

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Patricia Bellusci

Official Court Reporter

APPEARANCES:

GEORGE K. WEBER and THOMAS SOBOL, Assistant Attorneys

General for the Commonwealth

MARSHALL SIMONDS, THOMAS GRIFFIN and PAUL E. NEMSER, ESQS.,

for Philip Morris

PETER J. BIERSTEKER and THEODORE M. GROSSMAN, ESQS.,

for R.J. Reynolds

Thursday

July 16, 1998

Cambridge, Massachusetts

(10:07 a.m.)

THE CLERK: May I call the case, your

Honor?

THE COURT: Please.

THE CLERK: Docket number 95-7378,

Commonwealth of Massachusetts versus Philip

Morris, Inc., et. als. The Honorable Martha

Sosman presiding.

Will counsel please identify themselves

for the record?

MR. GRIFFIN: Thomas Griffin, counsel for

Philip Morris and liaison counsel for the

defendants.

MR. SIMONDS: Marshall Simonds, counsel

for Philip Morris. And I'd like to introduce two

new counsel, Ted Grossman from Jones, Day,

counsel for RJR; and Peter Biersteker, also from

Jones, Day, Washington Office, counsel for RJR.

MR. NEMSER: Paul Nemser, counsel for

Philip Morris.

MR. WEBER: George Weber, Assistant

Attorney General.

MR. SOBOL: Thomas Sobol, Special

Assistant Attorney General.

THE COURT: The first item on the agenda

is an update with regard to the Commonwealth's

damages model. I've received some materials from

the defendants, and then the Commonwealth's

position. I have not yet been able to get through

all of the various attachments and exhibits, but

at least the subject matter of what's in the

Commonwealth's status report, the narrative

portion, I have had a chance to review.

Where do we start?

MR. SIMONDS: If you'd like, the

defendants will begin, your Honor?

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. SIMONDS: We have furnished the

Court with two abbreviated pieces of material,

abbreviated in part because of time constraints,

and in part because of the fact that we were

trying to provide information to the Court that

was responsive to models that were being

delivered even as we were trying to analyze them.

I want to begin with the very simplest

differences that I think are not in dispute. And

I assume the Court has read the transcript pages

which provide the background and the context --

THE COURT: I've read them or I

remembered them. Your description of them was

consistent, quite frankly, with my own

recollection of that.

MR. SIMONDS: I'm confident it was. And

I don't plan to spend time on telling the Court

what the Court is already familiar with.

I do want to mention first off, that

prior to that argument which I happened to

initiate at the hearing in early November, we had

in fact, and during the lengthy period of

collecting documents, made the issue of the model

and their damage calculations, an early demand.

As early as February of '97, we had requested

information in a document requests.

In June of '97, when we were trying to

prioritize the documents that were critical, we

made the request again. And I think as you know,

through the fall, when we were coming to the CMO

issues and the schedule, we again were saying the

timing of our discovery and the adequacy of the

time for our discovery means that it's critically

important that we get this information about the

model and have it for an adequate time.

So that I think that there is no

surprise involved for the Court or for any party

in discovering that when we are confronted with

what we have today, what we think is grossly

inadequate time, we believe it has a very

important adverse affect on our ability to defend

ourselves.

Now, having said that, let me make

several obvious comments. One is, the report that

was filed was filed by six academic figures

associated with Harvard or Cambridge-based

organizations, called the Cambridge Team, none of

whom have been involved in any of the tobacco

litigation around the country that I'm aware of.

We have had three of those people, Dr.

Epstein, Dr. Cutler, I believe, and Dr. Newhouse,

identified as experts who will testify. None of

those people have been deposed, examined,

reviewed or evaluated in any of the other

litigation. We have submitted an affidavit by the

economatrician mathematician, who will be our

principal expert and advisor, William Wecker.

We have asked Dr. Wecker, in the limited

time he had available, to focus not on what he

thinks about their model in a substantive way,

but what the time problems are for the analysis

of the model. And his evaluation is set forth in

the affidavit, which I have to say,

unfortunately, is not yet signed but we will

provide a signature page, and I so represent to

you. We had to deal with Dr. Wecker on a boat off

the coast of Alaska in order to get this

affidavit reviewed, and that's why it was so late

reaching the Court.

However, the points that Dr. Wecker made

are in the affidavit, and we can go through them,

and perhaps it's useful to go through them and

emphasize them.

THE COURT: Well, I've reviewed his

affidavit, and there are a couple of things that

are not in that affidavit that I should perhaps

just ask you directly about.

How much -- I mean, he talks about how

many man-hours he had to use between himself and

his staff working on these issues in other cases.

But he does not translate that into how many

weeks, months, years that amounted to in those

cases. Nor does he give me an estimate of how

long it will take him on this case, he thinks.

I mean, five thousand man-hours is a

meaningless figure until you know how many people

that five thousand hours is being spent by. If

it's one person, that's a lot. If it's a 150

people in his office, that's another. I have no

idea what five thousand hours means in his world.

MR. SIMONDS: Let me try a preliminary

answer to that. And that answer is that at least

at the time we tried to obtain this affidavit, we

could not get an adequate answer to that question

for the reason that Dr. Wecker has not yet

received, nor have we received, the software

programs which permit him to understand the

methodology to identify the steps that he must go

through in replicating the calculations. We

haven't got that yet.

In, for example, Oklahoma, which happens

to be a Ness, Motley state as well, the expert

there, a man named Harrison, provided basically a

table of contents and a memorandum that said,

Here are the working tools I used to sort the

data and input it and make the evaluations.

They included sensitivity analyses. They

included a discussion of methodology. We don't

have that. We have asked for it. We expect we

will get it, but we don't have it yet.

Without looking at that at this stage,

there's inadequate knowledge on the part of Dr.

Wecker to give an accurate answer.

THE COURT: Can you answer the

historical question? When he refers to having

spent six thousand hours analyzing the data on

one of these cases, and another five thousand

hours on another, what did that translate into?

MR. SIMONDS: Let me give one more

answer, and see if it can be more specific.

The plaintiff's experts, by their own

statement, worked from early March to --

THE COURT: I want to know what Dr.

Wecker means when he says it takes five thousand

man-hours to review it?

MR. SIMONDS: Dr. Wecker's advise to us,

estimated, is that it will take him at least as

long as it took the plaintiffs. And the reason

for that is that he not only has to duplicate,

replicate, evaluate their work, but also develop

his own alternative and critique; in fact,

develop what amounts to a different model in

order to prepare a report that lets us join issue

on this critical aspect of the case.

THE COURT: All right. How much time did

he spend on the other cases?

MR. BIERSTEKER: I may be able to

respond to that, your Honor.

Peter Biersteker from Jones, Day. I've

worked with Dr. Wecker in a number of

jurisdictions. I can tell you he's got

approximately ten professionals in his office.

It's not 150 people.

In Mississippi and in Texas, Mississippi

I know for certain, I think we had a period of

about four or five months from the time we got

the disclosures by the plaintiff until we had to

submit our own expert reports and make our

experts available for deposition.

The time period in which we had to

respond in Minnesota was shorter than that. We

had approximately two months from the time we got

the final complete disclosures from the plaintiff

until the defense experts had to respond.

However, the Minnesota model that was presented

in that case used the same data set and was very

similar to, in some respects, the models that

were employed in Mississippi and in Texas. And

so, we were able to respond more quickly in that

event. But it still was five thousand hours in

order to do the Minnesota work.

We managed to do it in two months. We

were very lucky we were able to finish it. We had

longer in Mississippi. And I think it will take

at least as much time here if not more because of

the very significant differences in what the

model presents here compared to what it presented

in the other cases.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. SIMONDS: Would it assist the Court

if I went through the differences that are

identified in Dr. Wecker's affidavit? Or have

you already absorbed that?

THE COURT: Well, I've reviewed them,

but I have also reviewed the Commonwealth's

version that these differences are not

differences that are new. The Commonwealth says

some of them are differences because people like

Dr. Wecker in other cases have told us you should

be using this survey instead of that survey. In

other words, they're saying, to the extent that

we've done things that are different, we've done

things that have already been thought about,

looked into, talked about, and in some instances

recommended by the defendants themselves, that's

not novel. It seems to me it's a product of your

own expert's prior critique that they say they

are now taking into account.

MR. SIMONDS: The representations on the

plaintiffs was that they expected to use

substantially the same experts and the same model

with a tweaking for Massachusetts.

At the time they made that

representation, there was available to them

knowledge of the critiques that had been made. So

they were aware that they had been critiqued.

Those critiques which they relate to provide

their excuse for changing the model.

I'm not here to quarrel with you that

they weren't entitled to go to a different model

if they wanted to. They are permitted to try

their case in the way they believe most effective

and that's not the ground for our complaint.

Our complaint is that they made a

conscious choice to change the model in ways that

extended the time that we needed to respond, very

substantially. They made that decision months

ago.

You may recall that my partner, Mr.

Parsigian, was arguing on the issue of recipient

discovery, referring to the 1987 NMES database.

That was within, I think, less than a month, but

maybe a little more than a month ago, in this

court. Not a word from the plaintiffs that NMES

was no longer a part of this case. They weren't

going with that model.

They made the decision to change. They

spent a long time preparing it. They had to delay

a month getting information in. They haven't yet

gotten the information to us that we need, the

critical information to understand what their

experts did. And they rebut it by saying, well,

we criticized their earlier model.

It is true that there were some

criticisms. What is not true is that those

criticisms were based on a review and evaluation

of the data their experts are relying on. Dr.

Wecker has not gone through, for example, NHIS.

THE COURT: But to the extent that what

the Commonwealth's experts are doing is

essentially following up on a suggestion made by

the defendants themselves, that it is at least a

suggestion that the defendants and the

defendants' experts have thought about, are

familiar with, maybe haven't nailed it down in

every final precise calculation and thought, but

they're the ones who have come up with the idea

that, Gee, maybe you should take into account

this additional factor.

MR. SIMONDS: Your Honor, let me

interrupt you --

THE COURT: There's novelty in the sense

of an approach, a concept, a database that no

one's ever thought of or come up with before as

opposed to, we haven't seen this precise thing

actually done, but we have thought through, at

least conceptually, what might be involved

before, and it's a database that at least we are

familiar with, even if we haven't actually

cranked numbers through it before, there's a big

difference.

MR. SIMONDS: Let me make a response to

that at two levels. First off, my quick reading

of the filing which we got at the end of the day

yesterday from the Commonwealth is that there was

an attorney's rebuttal that asserts that we had

certain information and used certain information

and so forth. I believe that information is, in

material ways, very incorrect.

But secondly, even assuming that in a

critique of an earlier model in another state

alternative data sources were pointed to, that

did not involve any expert, Dr. Wecker or anyone

else, in taking that data, anticipating how an

opposing witness might use it, extracting the

data, evaluating it and studying it.

What happens when you get a model like

this is that you have to understand what

assumptions, what data extraction process, what

use of particular data, what weighing of data was

done by the expert. You have to understand how

they did it. That requires that you replicate it.

What you replicate is what they did; not

what you might have speculated about or looked at

before. And we have never - Dr. Wecker has never

used a substantial number of the databases that

are involved in this four-part model.

It is brand-new information. He doesn't

have the databases. He has not studied them. The

fact that he critiqued somebody for not

considering an alternative database should not be

read by the Court as a decision that we have

evaluated it and we've been laying in wait to use

it.

You can't do that in this econometric

model. You have to wait for the model to come out

so you can understand what it is they're going to

use; how they're going to use it; how they're

going to weight it and what they're going to do

with it. That in part is why it took so long,

even though we were going with the same basic

model, when you move from Mississippi and Texas

to Minnesota.

This is a very complicated business and

it is critical to the trial of this case. It is

not something that we can do within this time

limit because we ought to be familiar with it, or

we knew the databases were out there, or somebody

took a peek at one. We have not done that study.

We have to do that study and we have to replicate

their model before we can understand what the

challenge is; what we're attacking. The earlier

criticisms did not permit that.

THE COURT: Let me ask you what your

bottom line is looking at the case management

order itself, what changes in any of these dates

are you now asking for based on this, what you

say is his problem?

MR. BIERSTEKER: Your Honor, if I might

just add a little bit. Peter Biersteker again.

The state is partially correct when they

say that what they appear to have done responds

in part to the criticisms that defendants have

had elsewhere. For example, in none of the prior

models was exercise a factor that was taken into

account in trying to determine what portion of

the health care expenditures made by the state

were due to smoking as opposed to something else

that people did.

And the state's model here does take

exercise into account. But the defendants never

recommended that the state use the National

Health Interview Survey, a database that we have

not used in econometric modeling in the past.

The defendants did not suggest that the

state use the National Nursing Home Survey, which

we had never even heard about before, when they

try to do their model for nursing homes.

The defendants did not suggest to the

state that they use the National Maternal Infant

and Health Survey, which we had never heard about

until the state submitted its report in this

case. Those were not suggestions we made.

The defendants did not suggest that the

State of Massachusetts, or any other state,

compare utilization rates: how many times

somebody went to the doctor, how many times they

went to the hospital, and how long they stayed

when they went as opposed to how much money they

spent.

All the prior analyses that were done

with these econometric models focused on the

dollars spent as opposed to the utilization made.

I think that change that the State of

Massachusetts made is an affirmatively bad change

and it's not one that the defendants suggested.

So in answer to your question, it seems

to me that in substantial part, this model is the

creation of the plaintiff's own experts and not

done in response to criticisms that the

defendants had anticipated, that the defendants

had earlier articulated, or were made at the

suggestion of defendants and that the defendants

are --

THE COURT: I understand. There are very

differing views about this. But I'm looking at

page 6 and 7 of the case management order. What

changes to which of these dates are you asking

for based on this situation?

MR. BIERSTEKER: Well, your Honor, for

two reasons, I think that I would like to extend

the date on which defendants have to make their

disclosures under the case management order with

respect to the model, and that's the only date

that I would propose that we change.

THE COURT: Okay. And what are you

saying you need to change that to?

MR. BIERSTEKER: I would like three

months, your Honor, or more, from the time that

the State of Massachusetts delivers to the

defendants all of the information that we need in

order to do our work. That still hasn't happened.

We still don't have the computer codes and

formulas that they used. We still don't have all

the data. We're still missing information. A lot

of material has come over the transom over the

last couple of days, but we still don't have it

all.

Now, from the time that we get it all, I

would ask that we get three months. And I don't

know when the State intends to deliver all of it.

My understanding is that they hope to do so very

shortly. But from that time, we should have, at a

minimum, three months in order to present the

reports from the defense experts on the model

issues. That's what we need.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from

the Commonwealth.

MR. SOBOL: Good morning, your Honor.

I'd like to make one particular point

which I think is illustrative of the balance of

the argument. I do want to go a little bit into

what it is that our experts actually did so that

you can understand that it's building upon

reactions from prior critiques in other cases.

But going to the heart of the matter,

which is, how much time do the defendants really

need, and what have been their responses to you

on that particular question here today?

Mr. Biersteker reported to you that it

only took the same gentleman, Mr. Wecker, with

his staff, two months to deal with the Minnesota

report. And his indication to you here today

was, though, that was possible because the

Minnesota report was very similar to what had

gone on before, which is why they were able to

deal with it in two months.

That's not, however, what Mr. Wecker has

testified to in his affidavit. Because in his

affidavit, what he says at paragraph six, third

line from the bottom, was that the "Minnesota

statistical models and data analyses were

substantially different from the models presented

in Mississippi and in Texas."

So it seems to me that the expert is

saying that I was confronted by something

substantially different, but was able,

nevertheless, to get this accomplished within,

according to Mr. Biersteker, a two-month period;

Mr. Biersteker trying to accomplish something

different with you, indicates however, no,

Minnesota was really, in his words, very similar

to what had gone on before. So I think they don't

necessarily say the same thing, depending upon

what result they obviously want to be able to

accomplish.

The points raised by Mr. Simonds are

essentially these. First, that they had tried to

raise the issue of the damages model and issues

at an early point in time, and that's true. They

did raise the issue of receiving discovery last

year, and in fact they got it. They got a huge

amount of MMIS data tapes late last summer.

But what's remarkable is that apparently

they didn't do anything with that with Mr. Wecker

from that period of time all the way until today

because Mr. Wecker has testified under oath in

his affidavit that he's not familiar with the

MMIS; that he hasn't dealt with it. So you have

to wonder, well, you know, what was he doing in

that period of time? Was there any real effort

by the defendants on their own part to gear-up;

to have Mr. Wecker and his staff ready, come the

summer of 1998, for Massachusetts, so that they

could deal with the time frame constraints of the

CMO. It does not appear that that's the case;

that Mr. Wecker is sitting around waiting in

earnest to get going.

Another point raised by Mr. Simonds was

in fact that for the past month since they've had

the methods report, until even today, Mr. Wecker

hasn't been asked to start the work of doing the

job of analyzing this. Instead, what he has been

asked to do is deal with the time problem. In

other words, help them prepare for delay; not

help them prepare the case.

In addition, your Honor, there is --

it's important to point out this. The defendants

have received everything from the Cambridge team,

including not only their analyses, which is why I

apologize that I had to burden your Honor with

the fairly voluminous submission, but obviously

it's important in deliberating on this issue to

know what they have gotten, at least in terms of

the summary reports, which I've provided you.

But in addition to that, all of the data

sets that they have relied upon have been

provided to the defendants. The analyses appear

as appendices and that kind of thing, so that it

would enable Mr. Wecker and his staff to be able

to respond to the Cambridge team's work.

There is some work ahead. There is some

level of intelligence, understanding expertise,

that we have assumed that the defendants' experts

have. So, for instance, we assume that if we send

them something like -- and this is an analogy --

an ASCII disc that has some information on it,

that they have their own software program, like

Microsoft Word, or WordPerfect, or something like

that, to run it.

Well, economatricians, day in and day

out, deal with databases. They're confronted with

the database. In order to run a regression, they

pick up their regression software and they run

their regression software.

Now, it would be a little bit silly to

think that Mr. Wecker and his staff aren't

capable of running regressions, or they need to

be given the software of the Cambridge team in

order to be able to do that, and they need to be

taught how to type in the letter T, and the

letter H, and the letter E to be able to

replicate what it is that the Cambridge team did.

That's essentially what they ask when you talk

about economatricians facing that kind of

activity.

The data sets, too, are not from Pluto.

These are data sets that are very familiar to

health care economics, the NHIS. It's been around

for many many years. It's one of the most common

used data sets. Anyone who is involved in the

area of health care economics, knows of it, hears

of it, deals with it. And in fact, contrary to

repeated representations to you here today, Mr.

Wecker himself has testified under oath, in State

Attorney General tobacco litigation, that he has

received the NHIS data set, and he has listed the

NHIS data set as one of the bases upon which he

has critiqued other state tobacco experts.

The backup to that is not in the

materials that have been filed before you.

However, if your Honor wishes, I can provide the

affidavits or the photocopies of the transcript

of the deposition pages in which Mr. Wecker

discloses that plain fact.

That is not novel of course, my

indicating that Mr. Wecker is familiar with the

NHIS. It shouldn't come to anybody's surprise. He

has been working on at least six State Attorney

General tobacco litigations, and was previously

involved working for the tobacco industry, and

he's going to be an expert in the area of health

care economics, of course he's familiar with it.

He couldn't help but be.

The issue regarding the defendants need

to wait. Essentially they haven't needed to wait.

They, the defendants, repeatedly have insisted

for the past year, on the front-loading of

information from the Commonwealth. And if we look

at the three particular areas where information

gets crunched here, you'll see that the

Commonwealth has done everything it can to make

whatever the defendants wanted available,

available.

First, there can be no question that

anybody is quibbling about the defendants ability

to respond to prevalence, smoking prevalence: how

many people smoke in Massachusetts. Those data

sets are all well-recognized. There can't be any

mystery. There's no mysteries in any of these

reports. And then we have to figure out how many

people have smoked, and historically, how many

people have smoked. There's no issue there. There

should be no big issue.

And even if, by the way, the defendants

were starting from square one today, I think your

Honor, if you looked at the tables that are set

forth in the Cambridge team report, it is

immediately and intuitively obvious how it is

that the numbers get arrived at, and how any

person performing math would reach those numbers.

So the issue of prevalence is not a matter.

Second, the issue of expenditures, how

much money has the state, through the Medicaid

system, spent. Well, that has occurred in three -- excuse me, two basic areas: the electronic data

tapes that have been provided to the defendants

many many months ago; and in the form of HCFA-64

or other HCFA information which has been provided

in hard copy long before, or at least before the

filing of these reports. So the expenditure

information is available.

And then the third area is, how it is

that one derives, SAFs, smoking-attributable

fractions, from a variety of different data sets.

And their data sets, again, the one relied on

here by the Cambridge team on the inclusive

approach, is the NHIS, of which they are

familiar. It is essentially another data set that

an economatrician would look at and say, All

right, what do I have to spread along my X

column. How many, you know, people, do I have

along my Y column in order to establish my matrix

and to be able to plug in and run my regressions.

And in order to replicate it, that's

what any economatrician would do, is they would

set up their spreadsheet and they would run

similar kinds of regressions to see if they could

replicate the numbers.

The SAFs on the disease-specific

approach are, what are the smoking attributable

fractions for, for instance, lung cancer, how

many lung cancer diseases we'd want to attribute

to cigarette smoking. Well, that's straight out

of the Surgeon General's Report. There's no

mysteries there being given either.

Now, there are ways to quibble around

the edges. For instance, in each one of the

states that economists have approached this

issue, there are areas where the data ends up

having to be either state-specific or dealt with

anew. For instance, the area of low-birth-weight

babies.

Well, in the Massachusetts model

ultimately the Cambridge team's very conservative

approach, which essentially follows the same

disease specific approach, comes with such a very

conservative number of about $20 million, that

it's only one percent of the total dollar number

that we're talking about here. So that really

would fall in the area of tweaking, trying to

figure out a number that would be associated with

low-birth-weight babies, and essentially

following the disease-specific approach.

So essentially, to make a long story

short, from the Commonwealth's point of view, the

defendants' experts approach the project that is

in front of them in the following posture.

They have experts who, according to his

own testimony, for at least three of the states,

he and his team have already spent 11,000 hours

studying Medicaid damage expert opinion testimony

in State Attorney General tobacco litigation.

That's to the exclusion of any of the other time

and effort Mr. Wecker has spent in his career

being an economatrician, or working for the

tobacco industry, either outside of the

litigation context, or inside of one. So they

start essentially having gone around the track

three-quarters in terms of what they need to

know.

What else do they start with? They start

with the fact that they've had the Medicaid

Claims Paid data tapes for ten months. They start

with the notion that they are able to, and have,

weighed one way or the other, as a utilization as

opposed to an expenditure based SAF, good or bad,

what are the general theories there. What are the

general strengths and weakness of the NHIS

database as opposed to the NMES database. What

are their strengths and weaknesses on a

theoretical basis as to any database that people

have used that's essentially known and fairly

easy to address.

So what's the real work then that they

have in front of them? Well, on the inclusive

approach, they're probably going to want to

replicate what was done, so they take the data

that's been provided to them; they run a

regression to be able to see if they can mimic

the results, and then they're going to want to

spend four, five weeks, poking it and pulling it

to see if there are ways, according to their own,

of doing a sensitivity analysis to be able to

point out anomalies, trying to find out if there

were three or four bike accidents that were

within a certain grouping, that kind of thing.

Their real work of what they want to do

is just to find the anomalies on that side. And

what do they have in front of them on the

disease-specific approach?

Well, again, if they really feel

constrained to replicate what the Cambridge team

did, then what they will do is want to run

through the MMIS data tapes, not the 15 years

that our experts did, but the five most recent

years because we're dealing with a time period

substantially smaller than what we did before.

And they'll have to run that through.

That's why ultimately the Commonwealth,

when we come before you today, we try to have a

balanced position. On the one hand we recognize

that we've already asked the indulgence of this

court for some additional time to make sure that

the data crunching that was undertaken by this

group, who is new to tobacco litigation, but was

able to accomplish the task of understanding

everything out there, and then coming up with

their responses to the defendants concerns. And

undertaking all the work in four and half months,

being brand new, that would -- our position is

that while we should recognize that there should

be some extension, because we took three and a

half weeks, or almost four weeks longer to get

the file report in, that any further additional

time, if it's to be granted, should be granted

not for any of the reasons that have been given

to you here today.

If there are other reasons that we

haven't been given: Mr. Wecker is too busy

representing so many different states that his

staff is too, you know, inundated with time, or

that the professionals simply just need more time

to be able to deal with this for any variety of

personal or other legitimate concerns, then that

would be a different matter.

The Commonwealth's position is simply

that a reasonable similar time to the defendants

essentially running the same two months from the

time that we gave them the last report, which was

July 11th, is appropriate, but for the reasons

stated, no additional time is necessary because

this is exactly what the parties anticipated.

THE COURT: What is your response? What

items do you think, if any, the Commonwealth

still needs to turn over?

MR. SOBOL: I don't think that there is

anything that needs to be turned over. I need to

check with my associate regarding one particular

small database that I believe has been provided

to the defendants. If it hasn't been provided to

the defendants, it's a matter of a day or two.

I also don't know, because I haven't had

time to check, whether this is a database, which

I highly believe it is likely, that the

defendants have had all along anyway. It's a

well-known, recognized database. We've been

providing them recognized databases anyway. So

with the exception of that, the answer is, no.

Now, if the defendants have anything in

particular else that they need, for instance, if

it turns out Mr. Wecker doesn't have software to

run regressions, and he needs our software

package, well, then I guess we'll give it to him.

And if he doesn't know how to run that software

package with this data, well, if they ask us

that, I guess we'll have to teach him that. But

those are the kinds of details that we're really

being asked here for.

I have reviewed with three of our

experts, Mr. Wecker's report, and they candidly

do not understand how it is that an

economatrician can take a well-known, recognized

health care database, see the regressions that

have been run by our group, and not run the

regressions themselves. Because our experts say

when we ran the regressions, we didn't have to go

back and get trained by Glenn Harrison or Len

Miller or Vince Miller, or anybody else, how to

run a regression or to get their software package

to see what they've done before. This is what we

do day in and day out, is run regressions.

So the specific answer is that maybe one

minor one that I need to check with my associate,

but apart from that, our understanding is that

they have everything.

MR. SIMONDS: Your Honor, there are a

couple of specifics that Mr. Sobol spoke to that

relate to facts which Mr. Biersteker is more

familiar with than I am because of his prior

involvement, and I want to ask him to respond.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SIMONDS: In particular, I have in

mind the MMIS familiarity issue for Dr. Wecker,

and I also have in mind this latest business that

somehow the state seems to think that we need to

be educated on how to run a regression, whereas I

think --

THE COURT: Maybe if either you or Mr.

Biersteker articulate what are these items that

you say are missing that you need before your

people can even get started?

MR. SIMONDS: Let's see if we can

address that.

Let me say this, this delivery of data

sets which Mr. Sobol calls for, it was quarter of

six last night when one of those data sets

arrived in our office, and it was about six

o'clock the night before that an earlier data set

arrived. So that the notion that these data sets

have been all provided, if in fact they have

been, is a notion that was extremely current. I

mean, if that is a complete delivery of the data

sets they relied on, it just happened.

THE COURT: Mr. Biersteker?

COURT REPORTER: Could you speak a

little louder, please.

MR. BIERSTEKER: I'll do my best.

Sorry.

A couple of things. One, what we are

missing and what I didn't hear the Commonwealth

say they were going to give us, but it had been

my impression prior to this that they would, were

the actual computer programs used by their

experts. And let me explain that.

It isn't that our experts need to go to

school to learn how to do regression analyses.

They know how to do that. But as many

economatricians and statisticians, health care

economists as there are, there can be that many

different regression equations.

Now, they've given us the stack, sort of

description, a verbal description of what it is

that they have done. And they have described it

in sort of a generic way. But the devil is in the

details. The devil is in the details.

And we want to see how they get from

step one to step two, to step three, all the way

to the end, so that we can analyze the logic

which is contained in their computer programs so

that we can exactly replicate the results so that

we know that we're doing the same thing and --

THE COURT: All right. Let me -- I hear

Mr. Sobol saying that is standard regression

analysis software. Is it something else? I mean,

the man has his own. Why doesn't he try running

it on his own and see if he comes up with

anything different?

MR. BIERSTEKER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: If he comes up with

something different, then I can understand he

really wants to look at the Commonwealth's, but

has he tried running it with his own?

MR. BIERSTEKER: Well, we have just

received it, number one. And number two -- and it

keeps changing -- we've only gotten the data. We

still don't have all the data on which to run it,

or perhaps don't have all the data. It's my

understanding we're still missing one data set,

and we only got some of them last night at about

six o'clock. So, no, we haven't undertaken that

effort.

But what I'm saying is, it's a

fundamental misconception to think it's like

WordPerfect, which is the analogy that the

plaintiff's used.

The plaintiff's experts wrote their own

computer programs. They didn't go down to CompUSA

and buy a regression package off the shelf and

plug it into their computer, and voila, let it

run on the data. They had to write their own

computer programs. They've written them. There's

no reason on God's green earth why the

Commonwealth cannot give those computer programs

to us.

And I tell you, the replication, even

just the pure mechanical replication, taking

their computer program and applying it to the

data, is not something you can do with the snap

of your fingers. It just isn't. That has been our

experience.

And the notion that they've now told us

everything we need to know to understand how they

did what they did, is laughable. They had five

Harvard economists and statisticians working on

this for four and a half hours -- four and a half

months, rather. If they had to spend that much

time putting it together, how do they expect us

to recreate the whole thing based upon a very

cursory written description.

I'm asking for the formulas. I'm asking

for the computer programs. We've gotten them in

every other state. We're entitled to the them

here, and there's no good reason why they can't

give them to us. That's the first thing.

The second thing as to the MMIS data. We

have had the MMIS data for a period of time. We

have done some analyses of the MMIS data. But the

State of Massachusetts has done a fundamentally

different analysis using that data than has been

done elsewhere. This is set out in Dr. Wecker's

affidavit at paragraph 19. We have not gone back

and tried to do that. There's mountains of this

data. Mountains of it. Hundreds, if not thousands

of the standard sort of computer disks that you

use in your PC contain this data. It requires a

whole lot of effort. It requires, in some

instances, special hardware, bigger computers in

order to be able to do it. It's a very time

consuming process, and they have ambushed us,

having said they're going to give us a deja vu

model, they come out now with something that is

very very different than something that we have

seen elsewhere. And they expect us to have done

the analyses. We're responding to them. We look

at what they did. And we try to take a look at

it, and we try to make sure that they did what

they said they did, right. We try to look at

sensitivity analysis.

And now, let me get to what I think is

the bottom line, unless there is another question

that your Honor has, but what I think is the

bottom line. I don't see that we're all that far

apart. I heard the Commonwealth -- the

Commonwealth says in its submission on page 8, in

footnote 9, that it is reasonable to expect that

defendants replication of the disease-specific

results -- he's not even talking about the

inclusive model -- just the disease-specific

results could be accomplished in one month. All

right?

But we also have to replicate the other

analyses that they've done, the inclusive

approach that they did not address. So you can

add some more time for us to replicate those

results.

And then, I just heard the Commonwealth

say it's going to take four or five additional

weeks on top of that to do sensitivity analyses.

You bet you. It's going to take that long to do

it. And after we finish those sensitivity

analyses, all we have done is analyze what the

state has done, and poked some holes in it. And

then we're going to do our affirmative analyses,

and lo and behold, where do you end up if you add

three weeks onto that? At three months, exactly

what I asked for.

We're not that far apart. We're not

crying wolf.

THE COURT: The difference is you're

asking for three months from a date that isn't

yet ticking under your version. There's the rub.

There's the rub. I mean, there is not a big

difference in fact between what's in the case

management order, tack on for your side a

comparable extension to what the Commonwealth's

asked for, there's not a lot of difference

between that and three months, if the three

months is ticking now.

It's this notion that it's going to be

three months from the date you say you're

satisfied you've got everything, and I must say,

I do have a suspicion that if I bought into that

theory, I could hear for the next several months

how you really just still don't have everything.

I need a date certain, and if there are

things that you say you are missing, identify

them, the Commonwealth will be required to get

them to you. And if they don't and you need a

change on a deadline because of it, we can then

talk about that. But it's the open-ended quality

of three months from when we think we have

everything that is the problem.

Pick a date. Let's pick a date certain.

MR. BIERSTEKER: Well --

THE COURT: It seems to me, indeed with

these dates we're talking about, that it should

not have any impact on any other dates that

remain in the case management order. This is an

independent problem.

MR. BIERSTEKER: I agree as to that last

statement. It should not affect any other dates.

And the information is generally -- that

we want -- is generally described in paragraph 3

of Dr. Wecker's affidavit. We want their State's

experts' final and complete damage estimates. I

understand, at least, and I'd like to hear them

say, that what we've gotten is final and complete

and they're not going to change it anymore. It's

not a moving target. It's fixed.

I would like to get all the data. I

understand that we're missing one data set. I

don't know when the state can give it to us.

We'll check that and we'll make sure. But as soon

as they can get it to us, we'll have the clock

start ticking.

The other thing we need --

THE COURT: I'm not going to wait to

have the clock start ticking. I'm going to set a

date today that is the date.

MR. BIERSTEKER: I'm trying to describe

what it is we need. We need the formulas and

computer programs that their experts wrote and

actually ran to get the bottom-line number that

appears in their reports.

We need, if there are manuals that come

with the data sets that define what the different

fields are in the data, in other words, when the

data says smoking, what does that mean? You know,

there's a definition contained in the data set

that will tell you what that means, and we need

those definitions to the extent that we haven't

gotten them.

And finally, if the state has done

sensitivity analyses of their own, if they've

tested the validity and reliability or

statistical significance of the results that they

got, we would like to get that information as

well. They haven't talked about that in their

reports. I haven't seen any of that information,

and we certainly don't have the computer programs

that relate to it.

We've got orders from other courts that

spell out very clearly exactly the different

things that need to be produced, and I'll be

happy to supply those to the Court if you think

it will be helpful. But that basically is the

information, the information contained in

paragraph three of Dr. Wecker's affidavit which

generally describes what we need. And now the

clock can start, as soon as the state tells us

they can get us that, that's fine. And whatever

that date is.

THE COURT: As I've told you, that's not

the approach I'm going to take. I'm not going to

have the clock not starting ticking awaiting the

outcome of further arguments about whether you've

been given this or that. We're going to set a

date specific by which your stuff is due back,

your expert designations and disclosures in the

form of summary narratives and exhibits. I'm

going to adjust the date in that column on the

case management order.

MR. SOBOL: May I be heard, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SOBOL: First, I agree, your Honor,

that it isn't necessary to have a date for that.

I think we've learned in this litigation that

there are no such things sleep or weekends

anyway, so if we have the specific requests and,

you know, we just basically work around the clock

to be able to get it to the defendants and try to

do it as soon as we possibly can. So I think that

any date would actually be longer than it would

actually take us to be able to do it, so long as

we have the information, that's the way that we

try to handle these things.

In terms of what a specific date would

be, I have a comment and then a suggestion.

Working in this area is somewhat like having to

go to prison, and I'm just asking that the

defendants' sentence run concurrent not

consecutive. When they're doing their work, they

should have to be running concurrent sentences,

doing -- walking and chewing gum at the same

time, rather than trying to spread it out over an

entire three month period.

I just spoke with Mr. Weber. Our view

coming in here today was that the Commonwealth

thought that a comparable one month extension

would be appropriate, which would be from August

16th or thereabouts, to September 16th. And we'd

like to modify that to try to be magnanimous and

move this along. If the defendant's date instead

would be September 30, I'm assuming that's not a

weekend day off the top of my head, that provides

them six weeks essentially to be able to do this.

And if there's anything specific that they don't

have right now, they can call me this afternoon

and we'll be working over the weekend to get it

to them. That's our request in any event, your

Honor.

And Mr. Weber has indicated, and I think

it's important, we offered to give them anything

that they want. I mean, if they want something in

hard copy, they want some of the software, they

want a meeting, or they need to know some more

information, whatever it is that they want, so

long as it's not, you know, attorney-client

privilege, they'll get it.

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. BIERSTEKER: Provided that the

Commonwealth can deliver the materials we talked

about, and in particular, the computer materials

that their experts wrote and used in the next two

weeks, September 30th would be agreeable to us,

your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what I will do, I will

simply amend this date to -- let me double-check

the calendar. September 30th is a Tuesday. I'll

simply change this date to September 30th. I'm

not making that date at this point contingent on

any particular thing. If there is a problem --

MR. BIERSTEKER: Your Honor, I'm sorry.

I don't mean to interrupt. For a guy who does

damages stuff, I can't subtract very well and I

got my calendar mixed up. They propose September

30th, and I am in a time warp, I guess, and

missed the fact that that's really only two and a

half months.

I would very much ask for -- if we get

October 15th, that's only, basically, three

months from today and it has no time built in it

for us to get the materials we want, which the

State has not made a commitment to get other than

to -- in a specified period of time.

Assuming the State can deliver it one

week from now, I think October 15th is the date

that we would ask for instead of September 30. I

apologize.

THE COURT: Okay. October 15th is a

Wednesday. Since after all, I notice this, after

all, is a disclosure to which the Commonwealth

does not owe any response. It's purely at that

point a matter of trial preparation, and these,

after all, defendants' experts, would not be

taking the stand until fairly late in the

proceedings, I would anticipate, next winter. So

October 15th.

But, again, just because I keep hearing

this from the defendants, this, well, October 15

is alright if, I am not setting any such specific

conditions or contingencies. I am simply changing

this date. That's all I am doing. And if somebody

thinks they need to extend that date further,

explain why, but there's not going to be -- I am

not going to entertain a, "well, that date was

set on the condition that they get us the

following things in one week, and they didn't get

it to us for a week and a half, and therefore" --

I'm not setting any specific conditions. I'm just

changing the date.

So it's October 15. All right, now --

MR. GRIFFIN: Your Honor, could I bring

up one other date issue that I just want to alert

your Honor to.

There is another date you'll see on the

case management order time table, which is,

September 15, if I recall, for summary judgment

motions.

It is clear to me that one of the

summary judgment issues will be the use of the

model, or whether there is something by way of a

summary judgment issue we can present to your

Honor that deals with whether that model can and

should be used. So my thought is not to move

September 15th on summary judgment. Every other

issue that we can present will be presented on

September 15. The question is, we may need to

rachet back for one carry-over issue, which is,

if there is a summary judgment issue presented on

the model, that date has to follow October 15th.

THE COURT: Well, I disagree with that.

It seems to me the issue on summary judgment, any

issue on summary judgment, does not require -

does not require the kind of, you know, checking

out every last little thing that you might

criticize or talk about, because the standard on

summary judgment is so favorable to the non-moving party.

It seems to me that if there are such

gross, glaring problems with the Commonwealth's

model that they would literally result in summary

judgment in favor of defendants, those are the

kinds of big conceptual glaring defects that Dr.

Wecker ought to be able to identify for you in

time to make that conceptual argument in a brief

filed September 15th.

That does not require him to find every,

you know, every little thing where they might

have over calculated this, or under calculated

that. It's, is the model so grossly defective

that it just, you know, isn't even admissible or

that it comes out to zero as damages. I mean, is

there something so appalling about it.

It seems to me, errors that big, errors

that big, Dr. Wecker ought to be able to identify

in time for the September 15 filing,

understanding these people are going to spend

another month before disclosing their version and

all of their other criticisms or problems or

things they found when they've played with it.

But that's very different from a summary judgment

standard.

MR. SIMONDS: Your Honor, on that issue,

can I ask for the Court to consider a refinement

of the position you just stated?

I think, in talking about this before we

came here, the defendants are agreed that

whatever issues that are appropriate for summary

judgment that can be invoked under the model as

we know it should be dealt with without any

extension of scheduling.

If, however, as we analyze the model,

there are factual issues that call for an

additional summary judgment motion that cannot be

made until the analysis is complete, we would

like to reserve the right to argue that issue to

the Court and to look for a later date for that

portion of the summary judgment briefing and

argument. And we think it not unlikely that that

kind of an issue will arise and be appropriate

for consideration by the Court; not because of

egregious errors, but because of the need to

understand the model in order to appropriately

brief the summary judgment arguments.

THE COURT: On summary judgments where

the purpose of that argument I will have to weigh

everything in favor of the -- in favor of the

Commonwealth, it would seem to me it would take

some, as I say, glaring error, some defect of a

type that would make the entire thing collapse,

not just, well, it's a gross overestimate, or

it's a -- you know, they failed to take this into

account so it needs to come down for that, but

something that would make the entire thing

collapse. And, again, where Dr. Wecker has looked

at a number of these issues before, he ought to

be able to identify those for you in time for

your September 15th filings. So I do not intend

to make any amendment or adjustment to the

September 15 date at this point.

MR. SIMONDS: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SIMONDS: Can we have a date

designated by the Court for the additional

production from the Commonwealth?

THE COURT: No. I am not, because I do

not hear clearly what that difference or dispute

is. And discovery problems, you're supposed to

meet and confer before I entertain them. I'm not

going to set a date in advance of any time that

the parties themselves have sat down to hammer

out what additional items it is you say you need.

Mr. Sobol says, identify it and we'll

provide it to you even if we think you don't

really need it.

MR. SIMONDS: If I understand the

argument that has occurred before the Court this

morning, we look like we're ships passing in the

night. Mr. Sobol has identified WordPerfect and

our ability to run regression analysis, and Mr.

Biersteker has identified the software program

and formulas, and definitions, and manuals that

these particular experts used. That's the basic

stuff we're missing.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that's

your position, but discovery problems like that

are supposed to be subject to meet and confer

before I take them up. And I don't intend to take

them up this morning in the absence of that

having taken place. So I'm not -- that's why I'm

not setting some interim date about this

production.

Okay. Anything further before we move on

to the next agenda item, which I gather are other

discovery issues, and there was going to be an

update about where we stand on those.

Yes, Mr. Griffin?

MR. GRIFFIN: Agenda item number 2, your

Honor, a brief report as the agenda calls for.

Last week, Friday, July 10th, there was

a meet and confer of counsel to deal with various

issues. Included were two issues: the expert

discovery questions, and questions about the

Commonwealth's request to admit as to the

authentication of its documents.

I would simply report, in the course of

that meeting, both sides identified issues that

were of common concern, and figured out a

tentative approach to how to deal with them so

that we don't need to take your time today. And

just let me just describe what it is we talked

about and what we're going to do about them just

so you have a heads-up.

On the issue of expert witness discovery

issues, it was identified that both sides had

concerns that needed to be addressed about

whether there was a need for expert witness

depositions, who they should be, what they should

be, whether we need not replicate what's already

been done unless there's something new vis a vis

an expert who has previously testified or been

deposed in another case.

There are a bevy of new experts that

we'll have to deal with. We have decided that

issue needs to be addressed. The issue of closure

of expert witness position's has to be addressed.

Everybody is hedging that they need time to

supplement, will supplement as needed, but the

risk to both sides is that the failure to close

doesn't allow us to come to grips with what it is

we're going to be dealing with at trial.

Having identified that as a common

issue, we have decided to set up what's worked

for us in the past in terms of moving ahead on

the Court's business, which are subcommittees, a

defined group of counsel to deal forthwith with

that issue, come to grips with it, and see what

common ground we can work out in terms of dealing

with the issues.

On the second issue that we identified

on June 30th to raise with your Honor today was

the question about responding to the

Commonwealth's request to admit, authentication

of documents. We've got 12,000 documents which we

are supposed to respond vis a vis authentication.

I think everybody agrees, both sides,

because both sides have the same interest, to

come to some common ground, short-listing what's

really important. And again, we have tried the

tried-and-true method, which has helped us get to

the protective order, the CMO and whatever, which

is, to set up a subcommittee; both sides will

identify who will be on these committees and will

deal with those specific issues, not only

authentication of documents, perhaps, but a

preview of how to use documents at trial, by what

computerized technological approaches.

So rather than have to report any more

than that, I think we're basically at work and

we'll report to your Honor as soon as we can, if

we can, come to agreement on issues; if we can't

come to agreement, that we present it to you in

the appropriate way under the CMO.

THE COURT: Along those lines, another

issue that I wanted to raise today in light of

some of the discussion we had last time, and that

I would like taken into account in dealing with

this issue of both document authentication and

organizing things in terms of exhibits. I have

become deeply concerned that the way we were

dealing with the privilege claims has become

chaotic, and is problematic for me, and I think

for the parties, and will become disastrous at

trial.

Part of it, I think, for everybody

concerned, including myself, is that privilege

claims which are normally a discovery problem

are, in this case, largely a motion in limine

problem because events have overtaken us,

documents or the vast bulk of them that were in

dispute on privilege issues are now in the

Commonwealth's hands anyway, and it's a question

only of admissibility at trial, not use during

discovery, or not discovery itself. And I am

concerned that we are becoming side-tracked with

what are essentially motion in limine problems at

a time when the parties themselves still have

important true discovery issues that they both

need to address and will need my attention on.

I am also very concerned that by taking

the documents in the piecemeal way that the

Commonwealth has been submitting them to me, we

have -- I mean, at even the most fundamental

logistical level, problems. They're all being

given the same numbering. And I can see coming up

at trial, oh, no, the judge ruled that number 48

was this; or, oh, no, that was number 48 of the

set we heard in July, not the set we heard in

August. I mean, chaos. We are building up to

terrible levels of chaos.

It does seem to me, where it is a motion

in limine issue, and yet it will take more time

than the time we have allotted for the true

motions in limine at the very end in December and

January, that what we ought to be doing is indeed

setting a time where this is a matter of an

exhibit list, and I'm working off of, and

everybody is working off of, an exhibit list that

is on one comprehensive list, one comprehensive

chart, and that they come in to me -- I know it's

going to be a huge volume. I'll have to do

nothing but that for quite some time. But it lets

us all do it once; let's me see all the documents

in context, a clearer chart where everybody knows

what's been done, what hasn't been done.

On some of the documents, we also have

the problem, particularly if I find that the

Commonwealth has made a prima facie showing of

crime-fraud, that then shifts over and there's a

need for rebuttal, or we're doing rebuttal at the

same time we're doing other things, I think it

gets very very confusing.

It's very hard for me, also, to be sure

in my own mind that I'm being consistent about

some of the balancing that has to go into an

analysis of whether a particular document is

predominately non-legal advice as opposed to

predominately legal advice. That's a standard

that, whether I'm setting it correctly or

incorrectly, I ought to at least be setting it

consistently across the different categories of

documents.

And taking a look, a brief look at the

next set that the Commonwealth had sent in, it's,

you know, it's documents that are in some ways

similar to ones that I've already seen and ruled

on, and I'm trying to handle it consistently, I

can't do it piecemeal.

I think we need an exhibit list, and I

think the parties had mentioned the possibility

of a kind of a, you know, an exhibit list, that's

then a chart where we keep score of, you know,

what the parties' positions are, what rulings I

have already made, what still needs to be dealt

with on the defendants' rebuttal, and we get

final.

Some of the things also are coming in

and people are telling me on the day that it's

being heard, oh, we're withdrawing our privilege

claim on that; or, oh, the Commonwealth isn't

seeking it anymore; that these things could be

much better mapped out with a lot less confusion

if we were working off of one, comprehensive

trial exhibit list.

And I -- this possibility sort of

surfaced late in our proceedings last time, and I

obviously can't expect, and wouldn't expect, the

parties to be prepared to talk about that or

think about that in detail today, but I think we

should formulate such a plan for what's a

realistic time frame for the Commonwealth to be

providing an exhibit list, and then what the

columns on that chart need to look like so that

we then, from that exhibit list, work through

whatever the various objections are and my

rulings.

My own initial impression would be, we

would need to be in that position by sometime

towards the mid to late fall in order for me to

accomplish that task, and have that chart, as it

were, and all its columns, filled out enough in

advance of the actual trial date so that it's --

the work is all done sufficiently in advance of

February 1st.

But it would seem to me that rather than

proceed in the piecemeal fashion, and proceed,

you know, next week to just keep going in the way

we were going last time, that perhaps when we get

together next week, the parties can have thought

a little bit about a time frame for that task,

what's involved in it, how the chart should be

designed for the benefit of all concerned,

including myself, and approach it that way.

I think it can be done and I would

commit to doing it without pushing back the trial

date at all. Rather, it would just be an

acknowledgment on my part that when that chart

and its enormous stack of documents come to me to

review those issues, for all practical purposes,

I would say from that point on I'll be devoting

having to devote full-time to this case. But

that's going to happen sometime in the late fall

anyway, I suspect, at the rate we're going. It's

just a matter of when. And that issue could be

built into that.

I need to go to my Chief Justice about

that. But as I say, I won't expect people to

respond off the cuff today to that, but could we

put that on the agenda for next week, rather than

the review of yet another set of documents that

are numbered one through fifty-something,

identical sort of numbering of what we're already

dealing with.

I would also recommend, by the way, that

that chart include what it is we've already done,

in other words, columns that can already be

filled out based on what we've already done, will

be filled out. I'm not going to redo the work

that's already been done, but I think putting it

onto one comprehensive master list is necessary

and appropriate. And so, if people would address

their thoughts on that and some suggestions about

that approach next week, I'd appreciate it.

And we'll add that in the case

management order as to when we're going to be

handling those because they truly have been

converted into motions in limine.

MR. SIMONDS: As Mr. Griffin reported,

at the July 10 meet and confer, we did address

the issue of trying to get an exhibit list that

was manageable. I infer, I think clearly from

what the Court has said, that the place where

that list ought to begin is with those documents

that are basically defense documents that the

Commonwealth wishes to use against the defense,

and that defense has some claim that requires

your review of.

Ultimately, presumably, the exhibit list

that we deal with at a final pretrial level will

deal with all exhibits that are to be used on any

issue by either side with whatever stipulations

as to authenticity or admissibility we could work

out. But I presume the Court is focused at the

moment on the issue of how you deal with the

privilege, work product, crime-fraud issues.

THE COURT: That's what I'm focusing on.

But I must say, I think that it's a more

meaningful exercise if we are looking at

essentially a true and complete exhibit list that

simply, you know, if one of the items on that

exhibit list has an outstanding contest about

privilege, that's something that I've got to

address.

There may be items, probably a lot of

items on that exhibit list where there isn't a

privilege problem, maybe there's some other kind

of problem, maybe there's no problem. But with

the number of documents we're going to be talking

about, the number of lawyers who are going to be

involved in trying this case, the length of time

it's going to take to try this case even if

everything is going beautifully, we need an

exceptionally well organized approach to the

handling of exhibits.

And I am looking at not simply putting

the burden on the Commonwealth: okay,

Commonwealth, you've got to come up with your

exhibit list and whatnot, but everybody's got to

come up with exhibit lists so that we have a

master list on which problems, as we deal with

them, get checked off.

The most obvious, and it looks like the

biggest and most time consuming problem we have,

is the privilege issue, is the privilege issue.

But your thinking about these logistical problems

as you wrestle with the authentication problem as

well, and this is -- I really think I need to

shift gears and deal with the privilege problems

about the documents that the Commonwealth already

has as motion in limine problems, because that's

what are.

There are still some privilege problems

about things that have not yet been discovered,

and some of the Jones-Day issues, the witness

interviews and some of those things, that's where

I think my attention needs to be right now,

because that's discovery, that's true discovery;

that's things that one side wants and the other

side doesn't have; they have a disagreement, we

need to get that resolved. And I want to focus on

those, but put this into a comprehensive exhibit

list and the dealing of all motions in limine or

other problems with regard to the admissibility

of those exhibits.

I'm not, as I say, I'm not asking people

to commit to a format or sequence today, but it

does seem to fit into what Mr. Griffin was

talking about.

Anyway, give some serious thought to

that so that we can discuss it hopefully,

intelligently, next week, because it will take

some time for the parties to put this together.

And it's got to be put together in enough time to

resolve these privilege problems between that

date and the February 1 trial date. We'll work

backwards from the February 1 trial date and make

sure it gets done soon enough.

Yes, Mr. Weber?

MR. WEBER: Your Honor, I believe we've

scheduled two days next week.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. WEBER: So which day --

THE COURT: I would -- we had scheduled

two days, but I must say, that was at the time on

the assumption that I was going to be reviewing

another hundred documents. I don't know what else

the parties anticipate for next week's agenda. I

know some of the problems or issues about the

Jones-Day, the R&D Memo, and the Fact Team Memo

issues, the parties asked to do those next week

and not today. I want to obviously talk about

this issue that we've just talked about.

I don't know what else you have on the

agenda, whether it will in fact amount to two

days. If it does, I'm still holding those two

days for you. I haven't given them away. But --

MR. GRIFFIN: Your Honor, I had not

anticipated any other business besides those two

for the next two days, thinking that that 52

documents, plus whatever carry-over documents

remained from July 1, would more than fill up the

two days.

THE COURT: That certainly would fill up

two days, but I don't think that's a useful

expenditure of my time or the parties' time. It

will create as much confusion as it solves to

continue proceeding that way. That was my

impression, having been through it last time,

quite frankly.

MR. WEBER: You Honor, can I recommend

the second of the two days on the theory that it

would give us a little bit more time to work

through these issues?

THE COURT: I have no problem with that.

MR. GRIFFIN: I assume that the people

who would have been here anyway on Thursday and

Friday, can make it on Friday instead of

Thursday. So unless someone shouts that that's

inappropriate, I think we can live with certainly

Friday as a single day next week.

THE COURT: Let's assume then that it's

just Friday. If something remarkable happens so

that people think that we have an agenda that's

going to take more than one day, Thursday, you

know, let me know and we'll start Thursday

instead. But absent something fairly dramatic

happening, it sounds like Friday should be ample.

MR. SIMONDS: Your Honor, can I return

to the model with just one question?

I believe we have received an assurance

from the Commonwealth that the model as

submitted, and there were several compartments

that it came in, is now complete, and that there

is no contemplated supplementation still to come?

That is obviously an important issue in terms of

the time table we've set, and I'm therefore

requesting a representation by the Commonwealth

that we are in fact dealing with the end result

of their model.

THE COURT: Well, subject to what the

parties are themselves talking about about so-called finality on expert issues. I gather the

Commonwealth has turned over its: this is what we

intend to present. And that's been done.

Obviously, however, after they get back all of

Dr. Wecker's criticisms and problems, there is

going to be some ability to augment their expert

disclosures to perhaps respond to some of those,

and that awaits your disclosures, but everything

short of that, I understand has been done, am I

correct, Mr. Sobol?

MR. SIMONDS: That's what I'm asking

about, your Honor.

MR. SOBOL: Yes, your Honor. You are

correct. There is also the other issue that the

damages go up to the date of judgment, so there's

also the need of addressing that.

THE COURT: Okay.

I think that is all for today. The other

thing, I don't think we need to put it on for

next week, but something that I think we

certainly ought to be thinking about, or starting

to think about by the time we're getting together

in August is, I hate to say it this early, but

it's true, I have to start thinking about some of

the logistical issues surrounding trial because,

as you know, this court needs some lead time: the

summonsing in of extra jurors, space, logistical

constraints, are not something that I can do

without substantial lead time working with both

my Chief Justice, court reporters, the jury

commissioner, and whatnot, and we need to start

mapping out some of those things to make sure

that I have time to try and get the logistics up

to your expectations by February 1. So by August

we need to start dealing with mapping out,

literally, trial logistics on some of these

things.

MR. SOBOL: Your Honor, could you

identify what you perceive to be some of the

issues?

THE COURT: Well, one of the big ones

early on is indeed jurors and the impanelment,

just in terms of sheer numbers, i.e., what's the

best approximation of starting on February 1st?

How many jurors will we go through in a day,

because the jury commissioner is going to need to

send out extra summonses and he needs to do that,

I think, three months in advance. So I need to be

refining that so that I can put that in motion by

some time in the fall to make sure that we have

enough jurors coming in each day during

impanelment.

And those of you who have been through

impanelement in other states can shed a lot of

light on how it was done; what worked; what

didn't work; what that experience was, just so

that I can at least refine something about timing

and numbers for purposes of the jury

commissioner.

Simple space constraints are significant

given the number of attorneys that are going to

be involved, and courtroom space, and any

ancillary space that might be needed by the

parties themselves to handle the volume of

attorneys, witnesses, consultants, etcetera, that

you all need.

The other important logistical issue is

court reporters. What is it that the parties are

expecting, wanting, in terms of transcripts? If,

for example, if the parties are wanting literally

daily copy for every single day of this trial,

that is something that court reporters need to

know about long in advance to map something that

labor intensive out.

I guess perhaps what it is in August I

want is something of your anticipated needs, what

you're going to be looking for in terms of those

issues.

What do you want in terms of the

logistics of how we handle the documents, again,

just to make sure that -- those of you who are

not from Massachusetts perhaps don't realize what

some of our logistical constraints are here, but

the Massachusetts lawyers will be very familiar

with that. So it's as much a laundry list of

your expectations and your needs so that I'm not

confronted with something that's a perfectly

legitimate request on your part without enough

time to -- we literally have some courtrooms in

this Commonwealth that do not have alternating

current. I mean this is how -- so when we talk

logistics, sometimes we talk logistics at a very

fundamental level, and I want to make sure that

we can do the best we can on such things.

So because of the lead time, I might

need to address those kinds of issues. We do need

to start thinking about them by late summer and

as we get even into the early fall. So those are

the kinds of things that we ought to start, at

least in a preliminary way, talking about by next

month I think.

All right, I'll see you next Friday.

[Court adjourns 11:29 a.m.]

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Patricia Bellusci, do hereby certify that the

foregoing transcript, pages 3 through 75, is a

complete, accurate and true record of my voice recorded

tapes taken in the aforementioned matter to the best of

my skill and ability.

_______________________

Patricia Bellusci

Official Court Reporter

The foregoing certification does not apply to any

reproduction of the same by any means unless under the

direct control and/or direction of the certifying

reporter.


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